Credits: White House (Daniel Torok) — public domain.
Donald Trump has asked several Arab or Muslim countries to join the Abraham Accords. At the same time, Washington is still seeking an exit to the war with Iran. The pressure is mainly on Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These two regional mediators thus see a dossier already tied to Hormuz, Gaza and the balances of the Gulf become more complicated.
A Public Request At The Heart Of Talks With Tehran
The U.S. president linked the expansion of the Abraham Accords to the possible agreement under discussion with Iran on Monday, May 25. According to Reuters, he said he had asked six countries to normalize their relations with Israel together. Named were Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan.
The message, posted on Truth Social and corroborated by several media outlets, presents normalization as a political condition. It would be tied to the major regional settlement sought by Donald Trump. The U.S. president wants these countries to sign the Abraham Accords immediately. He thus suggests that a possible Iranian deal be part of a broader coalition.
This wording changes the nature of the sequence. Talks with Tehran are primarily about ending hostilities. They include the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear file and, according to Reuters, frozen Iranian funds. Donald Trump adds to this an old objective of his diplomacy: expanding the Abraham Accords, concluded in 2020 during his first term.
What Are The Abraham Accords
The Abraham Accords refer to normalization arrangements between Israel and several Arab or Muslim states. The cycle begins with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in 2020. It then extends to Morocco and Sudan. They differ from earlier peace treaties. Egypt signed in 1979, Jordan in 1994.
The question “who signed the Abraham Accords” is therefore central to understanding Donald Trump’s bet. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are already in the framework. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan are now named by Donald Trump. But each of these countries is in a very different position vis‑à‑vis Israel.
For Washington, the political interest is clear: to present a compromise with Iran as more than a simple military de‑escalation. Expanding the Abraham Accords would give the issue a dimension of regional realignment. But this ambition runs up against the war in Gaza and Arab public distrust of Israel. It also confronts conditions Riyadh has set for years.
Riyadh And Doha Put In A Delicate Position
Le Monde reports that the U.S. request surprised Gulf countries. These countries are being solicited as mediators in the Iranian crisis. They are also publicly pressured to normalize with Israel. The newspaper quotes a Saudi official who said the kingdom’s position has not changed. Riyadh still demands an irreversible path to a Palestinian state before any normalization with Israel.
Qatar faces a different constraint. Doha hosts and facilitates part of the discussions around a possible agreement between the United States and Iran. The National, citing Iranian media, reports two trips to Doha. They involved Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, president of the Iranian Parliament, and Abbas Araghchi, foreign affairs official. The consultations focus on ending the war and the Strait of Hormuz.
In this context, tying Qatari mediation to signing the Abraham Accords exposes Doha on a politically explosive issue. Qatar maintains channels with several regional actors, including on Palestinian dossiers. A public normalization with Israel does not carry the same diplomatic cost as a technical mediation between Washington and Tehran. Gaza remains at the center of Arab reluctance.
Pakistan Refuses, Other Capitals Hedge
The first clear refusal came from Pakistan. Reuters reports that a Pakistani source rejected linking the two files. According to it, a deal with Iran and the Abraham Accords cannot become interdependent. Pakistani and regional media also cite Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif. He deems joining incompatible with Islamabad’s core positions.
At this stage, Reuters indicates that no positive public reaction has come from the other countries approached. That absence is not an official refusal, but it shows the caution of the capitals involved. Turkey has recognized Israel since 1949. Egypt and Jordan have older peace treaties. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have not taken that step.
The sequence mainly illustrates a diplomatic tension. Donald Trump seeks to create a single regional package. Gulf mediators, for their part, have an interest in separating the issues. For them, helping to reopen Hormuz or stabilize a truce with Iran is not worth normalizing with Israel. They lack a visible Palestinian concession.
Hormuz, Gaza And The Nuclear Issue Remain The Real Locks
The negotiation with Iran is not finalized. Axios reported as early as Saturday that the draft under discussion was supposed to end the war. It was also to gradually reopen the Strait of Hormuz and open a more detailed negotiation on Iran’s nuclear program. The same outlet noted that U.S. officials had already believed they were close to an agreement without it materializing.
On May 26, Marco Rubio cooled expectations of an immediate announcement. According to Reuters, the U.S. secretary of state estimated the negotiation could still take a few days. At the same time, U.S. forces carried out new strikes in Iran. Washington presents them as acts of self‑defense. This simultaneity underscores the fragility of the process.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most sensitive points. It concentrates a major share of global energy traffic. Its possible gradual reopening would be an economic as well as military signal. But linking this maritime lock to Arab‑Israeli normalization adds an explosive political level. Neither Tehran, nor the Gulf mediators, nor regional public opinions can treat it as an ancillary clause.
A Possible Diplomatic Victory, But High Risk
Donald Trump is trying to turn an uncertain de‑escalation with Iran into a broader diplomatic victory. The idea may appeal to part of his supporters in Washington. It also targets those who want to embed Israel in a more favorable regional architecture. It finally allows presenting a compromise with Tehran as an extension, rather than a break, of his pro‑Israeli line.
But the Abraham Accords have always had a limit: they have skirted the Palestinian question more than they have resolved it. From Gaza, that limit weighs more heavily. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel would be a historic shift that requires political guarantees. For Qatar, it could muddy its role as mediator. For Pakistan, it touches an internal and ideological line the government cannot alter under public pressure.
The U.S. request therefore places the Gulf countries before a difficult equation. Participating in the de‑escalation effort with Iran makes them indispensable to Washington. But responding favorably to the injunction on Israel could weaken them in the region. Between Hormuz, Gaza and the Abraham Accords, Donald Trump tried to fit several crises into the same diplomatic package. That is precisely what can make the deal more spectacular, or much harder to sign.