Credits: White House (Daniel Torok).
Donald Trump has asked several Arab or Muslim countries to join the Abraham Accords. At the same time, Washington is still searching for an exit from the war with Iran. The pressure is aimed mainly at Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These two regional mediators are now seeing a file already hanging over Hormuz, Gaza, and Gulf power balances become even more complicated.
A Public Request At The Center Of Talks With Tehran
On Monday, May 25, the U.S. president linked expanding the Abraham Accords to the possible deal under discussion with Iran. According to Reuters, he said he had asked six countries to normalize relations with Israel together. The countries named are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan.
The message, posted on Truth Social and corroborated by several media outlets, presents normalization as a political condition. It would be tied to the broader regional deal Donald Trump is seeking. The U.S. president wants these countries to sign the Abraham Accords immediately. In doing so, he is suggesting that any Iran deal should be part of a broader coalition.
This wording changes the nature of the sequence. Talks with Tehran are first and foremost about ending hostilities. They include the gradual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear file, and, according to Reuters, frozen Iranian funds. Donald Trump adds to that an old goal of his diplomacy: expanding the Abraham Accords, concluded in 2020 during his first term.
What The Abraham Accords Are
The Abraham Accords refer to normalization arrangements between Israel and several Arab or Muslim states. The cycle began with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in 2020. It later expanded to Morocco and Sudan. They differ from older peace treaties. Egypt signed one in 1979, and Jordan in 1994.
The question “who signed the Abraham Accords” is therefore central to understanding Donald Trump’s gamble. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are already in the framework. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan are now being cited by Donald Trump. But each of these countries is in a very different position when it comes to Israel.
For Washington, the political logic is clear: to present a compromise with Iran as something other than a simple military de-escalation. Expanding the Abraham Accords would give the issue a regional realignment dimension. But that ambition runs up against the war in Gaza and Arab public distrust of Israel. It also confronts the conditions Riyadh has been setting for years.
Riyadh And Doha Put In A Delicate Position
Le Monde reports that the U.S. request surprised Gulf countries. These countries are being asked to serve as mediators in the Iran crisis. They are also being publicly pushed to normalize with Israel. The newspaper quotes a Saudi official as saying the kingdom’s position has not changed. Riyadh still demands an irreversible path toward a Palestinian state before any normalization with Israel.
Qatar faces a different constraint. Doha hosts and facilitates part of the discussions around a possible deal between the United States and Iran. The National, citing Iranian media, reports two trips to Doha. They involve Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian Parliament, and Abbas Araghchi, foreign minister. The talks focus on ending the war and the Strait of Hormuz.
In this context, tying Qatar’s mediation to signing the Abraham Accords amounts to putting Doha on the spot over a politically explosive issue. Qatar maintains channels with several regional actors, including on Palestinian issues. Public normalization with Israel does not carry the same diplomatic cost as technical mediation between Washington and Tehran. Gaza remains at the center of Arab reluctance.
Pakistan Refuses, Other Capitals Stall
The first clear refusal came from Pakistan. Reuters reports that a Pakistani source rejected linking the two issues. According to that source, the deal with Iran and the Abraham Accords cannot become interdependent. Pakistani and regional media also quote Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif. He says joining would be incompatible with Islamabad’s core positions.
At this stage, Reuters says no positive public response has come from the other countries approached. That absence does not amount to an official refusal, but it does show the caution of the capitals involved. Turkey already recognized Israel in 1949. Egypt and Jordan have older peace treaties. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have not taken that step.
The sequence mainly illustrates a diplomatic tension. Donald Trump is trying to create a single regional package. The Gulf mediators, meanwhile, have an interest in keeping the issues separate. For them, helping reopen Hormuz or stabilize a truce with Iran is not the same as normalization with Israel. They still lack a visible Palestinian counterpart.
Hormuz, Gaza, And Nuclear Talks Remain The Real Sticking Points
The negotiations with Iran are not finalized. Axios reported as early as Saturday that the draft under discussion was supposed to end the war. It was also supposed to gradually reopen the Strait of Hormuz and open a more detailed negotiation on Iran’s nuclear program. The same outlet noted that U.S. officials had already thought they were close to a deal before it fell apart.
On May 26, Marco Rubio cooled expectations of an immediate announcement. According to Reuters, the U.S. secretary of state said the negotiations could still take a few days. At the same time, U.S. forces carried out new strikes in Iran. Washington describes them as self-defense. That simultaneity underscores how fragile the process is.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most sensitive points. It carries a major share of global energy traffic. Its possible gradual reopening would be an economic signal as much as a military one. But linking that maritime chokepoint to Arab-Israeli normalization adds an explosive political layer. Neither Tehran, nor the Gulf mediators, nor regional public opinion can treat it as an incidental clause.
A Possible Diplomatic Win, But A High-Risk One
Donald Trump is trying to turn an uncertain de-escalation with Iran into a broader diplomatic win. The idea may appeal to part of his base in Washington. It also targets those who want to place Israel within a more favorable regional framework. And it allows him to present a compromise with Tehran as an extension, not a break, from his pro-Israel line.
But the Abraham Accords have always had one limit: they sidestepped the Palestinian question more than they solved it. Since Gaza, that limit matters even more. For Saudi Arabia, normalization with Israel would be a historic shift that requires political guarantees. For Qatar, it could muddy its role as mediator. For Pakistan, it touches on a domestic and ideological line the government cannot move under public pressure.
The U.S. request therefore puts Gulf countries before a difficult equation. Taking part in de-escalation efforts with Iran makes them indispensable to Washington. But responding favorably to the push on Israel could weaken them in the region. Between Hormuz, Gaza, and the Abraham Accords, Donald Trump has tried to fit several crises into one diplomatic package. That is precisely what could make the deal more dramatic — or much harder to sign.