Donald Trump’s U-Turn on March 23, 2026, Provided Markets With a Dramatic Respite. The U.S. president postponed for five days his threat to strike Iran’s energy network, saying promising exchanges were underway. But this change in tone neither reopened the Strait of Hormuz nor dispelled the economic risk. For energy importers, fertilizer producers, and agricultural sectors, the key point remains: logistics are still severely degraded, and the shockwave can still ripple up to food prices.
Trump Pauses, But The Strait Remains Jammed
On March 23, 2026, Reuters reported that Donald Trump had suspended for five days his threat to strike Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure. Markets immediately eased: oil fell sharply, stocks rebounded, and the dollar weakened. But this financial breathing space should not be mistaken for a return to normal on the ground.
The ultimatum itself sheds light on this retreat. Reuters had reported the day before that Trump threatened to destroy Iranian power plants, starting with the largest. In response, Tehran threatened retaliation against electrical systems and Gulf desalination facilities—that is, infrastructure vital for drinking water and daily life in several U.S.-allied states. It is therefore plausible that this regional, human, and strategic cost was judged far too high by the United States.
At the same time, Iran denied the existence of real direct negotiations with Washington. Above all, Reuters noted the same day that traffic through Hormuz remained extremely reduced. Two tankers carrying LPG to India did transit the passage, but they are exceptions in an otherwise highly disrupted system. According to maritime broker Clarksons, traffic through the strait remained about 95% below its pre-war level.
Hundreds of ships remain at anchor inside or outside the Gulf, while roughly 20,000 sailors remain stranded in the area, according to Reuters-cited data. The strait is therefore less “reopened” than partially passable on a case-by-case basis, under a military and insurance risk that continues to crush trade fluidity.
The Strait of Hormuz still concentrates a major systemic risk. Before the war, about one-fifth of global flows of oil and liquefied natural gas transited there. Even if some cargos still pass, this maritime choke point remains the most dangerous compression point for global energy.
Why Fertilizers Remain The Real Blind Spot Of The Crisis
It’s the least visible domino effect, but one of the most important. Reuters reported on March 17, 2026, that about one-third of global fertilizer trade usually passes through Hormuz. That figure changes the scale of the issue: we’re no longer talking only about gasoline or heating, but about agricultural inputs that directly determine yields.
Ammonia and urea are particularly exposed. Their production depends heavily on gas, which represents a large share of their manufacturing costs. When LNG becomes scarce or more expensive, fertilizer follows. And when maritime routes also become complicated, the problem is no longer just price: it also affects timing, inventories, and the ability to deliver at the right moment.
Trump’s reversal does not change this underlying dynamic. An immediate drop in oil can relieve some market nerves, but it does not fix maritime queues, insurance premiums, or the disruption of supply schedules. In several Northern Hemisphere regions, a few weeks’ delay is enough to disrupt purchases and force trade-offs on fertilizer application rates.
On March 20, the executive director of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, included fertilizers among the major economic losses already caused by the crisis. His reasoning still holds after the U.S. pause: as long as a large share of global deliveries remains impeded or unpredictable, the shock can quickly propagate to agricultural and then food prices.
Markets Reassured, Not The Supply Chains
The effect on food is neither automatic nor uniform. It will all depend on the duration of the disruption, the actual level of maintained traffic, and the capacity of states or large buyers to reroute flows. So one should avoid speaking too quickly of a generalized shortage. However, the risk of tension remains well documented.
Reuters reported on March 13 that China had decided to draw on its commercial fertilizer reserves before spring sowing to support supply and calm prices. That decision already showed that some major importers no longer banked on a rapid normalization. The March 23 reports are not yet enough to invalidate that assessment.
For farmers, the mechanism is very concrete: more expensive diesel for machinery and transport, more expensive gas to produce certain fertilizers, and riskier freight to deliver on time. For manufacturers and distributors, this means more frequent trade-offs between securing volumes and accepting higher costs. For consumers, it mostly sets the stage for diffuse inflation rather than a single, visible shock.
Emerging countries remain the most vulnerable. They often have lower stocks and less budgetary room to cushion energy or input costs. A prolonged crisis at Hormuz could therefore worsen both imported inflation and food vulnerabilities, even as the White House now searches for a diplomatic way out.
What Can Be Said, And What Still Must Be Considered Uncertain
The most solid thing at this stage is the order of magnitude of the shock. Hormuz remains a major node for oil, LNG, and fertilizers. Trump’s U-turn changes the political narrative of March 23, 2026, and it was enough to produce immediate market relief. But it is not, for now, sufficient to erase the material disorganization of the strait.
The major uncertainty now concerns the reality and durability of the diplomatic détente. Trump speaks of major points of agreement; Iran contests the very existence of real talks. Between these two versions, we must stick to what we observe: some passages are resuming, but traffic remains far below normal and logistics stay under strain.
This is the peculiarity of this crisis. It starts as a geopolitical and energy story, then extends to far more everyday sectors: fertilizers, harvests, freight, and food. As long as traffic at the Strait of Hormuz remains degraded or unpredictable, the world will have to manage not only a price shock but also a less visible—and thus more easily underestimated—agricultural and food risk.