Credits: NASA / Wikimedia Commons — Public domain.
Donald Trump’s reversal on March 23, 2026, gave markets a dramatic reprieve. The U.S. president delayed his threat to strike Iran’s energy network by five days, saying promising talks were underway. But that change in tone neither reopened the Strait of Hormuz nor eased the economic risk. For energy importers, fertilizer producers, and agricultural supply chains, the key point remains the same: logistics are still severely disrupted, and the ripple effect could still reach food prices.
Trump Puts Things on Hold, But the Strait Remains Jammed
On March 23, 2026, Reuters reported that Donald Trump had put on hold for five days his threat to strike Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure. Markets immediately welcomed the move: oil prices fell sharply, stocks climbed, and the dollar lost ground. But this financial breather should not be mistaken for a return to normal on the ground.
The ultimatum itself makes the setback clear. Reuters had reported the day before that Trump was threatening to destroy Iranian power plants, starting with the largest one. On the other side, Tehran was threatening retaliation against the Gulf’s power systems and desalination facilities, that is, vital infrastructure for drinking water and daily life in several states allied with Washington. It is therefore plausible that the United States judged this regional, human, and strategic cost far too high.
At the same time, Iran denied that any real direct negotiations with Washington were taking place. More importantly, Reuters reported that traffic through Hormuz remained extremely limited on the same day. Two tankers carrying LPG to India did make it through the passage, but they are an exception in an overall situation that remains highly disrupted. According to maritime broker Clarksons, traffic through the strait remained about 95% below prewar levels.
Hundreds of ships remain anchored inside or outside the Gulf, while about 20,000 sailors remain stranded in the area, according to data cited by Reuters. So the strait is less “reopened” than only partially passable, on a case-by-case basis, under military and insurance risks that continue to crush trade flow.
The Strait of Hormuz still represents a major systemic risk. Before the war, about a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows passed through it. Even if a few cargoes are still getting through, this maritime chokepoint remains the most dangerous bottleneck for global energy security.
Why Fertilizer Remains the Real Blind Spot in the Crisis
This is the least visible domino effect, but one of the most important. Reuters reported on March 17, 2026, that about one-third of global fertilizer trade usually passes through Hormuz. That number changes the scale of the issue: this is no longer just about gasoline or heating, but about agricultural inputs that directly determine yields.
Ammonia and urea are especially exposed. Their production depends heavily on gas, which makes up a very large share of their manufacturing costs. When LNG becomes scarcer or more expensive, fertilizer follows. And when shipping routes also become more complicated, the problem is no longer just about price: it also affects timing, inventories, and the ability to deliver at the right moment.
Trump’s reversal does not change this underlying dynamic. An immediate drop in oil prices may ease some market jitters, but it does nothing to fix shipping queues, insurance premiums, or disrupted supply schedules. In several regions of the Northern Hemisphere, a delay of just a few weeks is enough to disrupt purchasing and force tradeoffs in fertilizer application rates.
On March 20, the executive director of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, also included fertilizers among the major economic losses already caused by the crisis. His reasoning still holds after the U.S. pause: as long as a large share of global shipments remains blocked or unpredictable, the shock can quickly move up to agricultural prices and then to food prices.
Markets Are Reassured, But Not the Logistics Chains
The impact on food is neither automatic nor uniform. It will all depend on how long the disruption lasts, the actual level of traffic that can be maintained, and the ability of governments or major buyers to redirect flows. So it is still too early to talk about a general shortage. However, the risk of strain remains very real.
Reuters reported on March 13 that China had decided to draw on its commercial fertilizer reserves before spring planting to support supply and calm prices. That decision already showed that some major importers were no longer betting on a quick normalization. The information from March 23 is not enough yet to invalidate that assessment.
For farmers, the mechanics are very concrete: more expensive diesel for machinery and transport, more expensive gas to produce certain fertilizers, and riskier freight to deliver on time. For manufacturers and distributors, it means more frequent tradeoffs between securing volumes and accepting higher costs. For consumers, it mainly points to diffuse inflation rather than a sudden, one-off shock.
Emerging markets remain the most vulnerable. They often have less inventory and less budget room to absorb higher energy or input costs. A prolonged crisis in Hormuz could therefore worsen both imported inflation and food vulnerabilities, even if the White House is now looking for a diplomatic off-ramp.
What We Can Say, and What Still Remains Uncertain
At this stage, the most solid fact is the scale of the shock. Hormuz remains a major chokepoint for oil, LNG, and fertilizer. Trump’s reversal changes the political narrative of March 23, 2026, and it was enough to trigger immediate relief in the markets. But for now, it does not erase the physical disruption at the strait.
The biggest uncertainty now is the reality and durability of any diplomatic easing. Trump speaks of major points of agreement; Iran disputes that any real talks are even taking place. Between those two versions, the best course is to stick to what can be observed: a few passages are resuming, but traffic remains far below normal and logistics are still under strain.
That is the real uniqueness of this crisis. It starts as a geopolitical and energy story, then spreads into much more everyday sectors: fertilizer, harvests, freight, and food. As long as traffic through Hormuz remains disrupted or unpredictable, the world will have to manage not only a price shock, but also a less visible—and therefore more easily underestimated—agricultural and food risk.