Facing the objective, Giorgia Meloni poses for her official 2024 portrait. The institutional image accompanies a debate in which the prime minister is playing a decisive hand for 2027. Credits: Governo Italiano / Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Italy (CC BY 3.0 IT).
The Chamber of Deputies approved, on July 16 in Rome, an electoral reform that combines proportional voting with a majority bonus. The mechanism provides for a bonus of 105 seats, capped, for the coalition that comes out on top if it exceeds 42% in both chambers. Still pending before the Senate, the text could favor Giorgia Meloni’s camp in 2027. It would not, however, guarantee her victory.
A First Green Light, Not Yet a Law
Italian deputies adopted proposal C. 2822-A by 217 votes to 152, with two abstentions. The final vote was held by secret ballot. This first reading does not yet change the electoral rules: the Senate must approve the same text before it is promulgated. If it amends it, the Chamber will have to vote again.
The bill, nicknamed “Stabilicum” by its backers, would replace the “Rosatellum,” the mixed system used since 2017. The right-wing majority presents it as a way to produce more stable governments. The opposition sees it as a mechanism designed to extend the power of the outgoing coalition.
The 42% Threshold That Triggers the 105-Seat Bonus
The new system would keep a proportional base: each force would first win seats according to its result. It would then add a “governability bonus” of 70 seats in the Chamber and 35 in the Senate. This bonus would go to the list or coalition that meets two conditions. It would have to finish first in both houses and win at least 42% of the vote in each.
The beneficiary could not, however, exceed 220 deputies and 113 senators, excluding overseas elected officials. These caps would secure an absolute majority without giving up the two-thirds of the seats. When the proportional share and the bonus exceed this ceiling, the excess seats are deducted. The net gain is therefore not necessarily 105 elected members.
A simulation makes it possible to measure the effect of the threshold. With 41.9% of the vote in one chamber, no bonus would be awarded and all seats would be distributed proportionally. At 42% in both chambers, the mechanism would kick in. This example illustrates the rule, but it is not a projection for 2027: the results, coalitions, and territorial distribution remain unknown.
If no force reaches 42%, or if the two chambers put different coalitions in first place, the bonus disappears entirely. The distribution then remains proportional. Access thresholds would stay at 3% for a list and 10% for a coalition. A limited runoff would still be possible within alliances.
Closed Lists And No Preference Vote
For voters, the most visible change would be the elimination of districts where only one candidate is elected. All lawmakers would be chosen in multi-member districts, using lists drawn up in advance by the parties. Voters would choose a list, without being able to change the order of candidates.
The majority had tried to reintroduce up to three preferences while keeping a locked-in lead candidate. The amendment was rejected on July 14 by 188 votes to 187, despite the government parties’ stated support. The secret ballot exposed defections within their ranks, and the text voted on two days later kept closed lists.
Another detail: parties would have to name, in their platform, the person they propose for the presidency of the Council. That person’s name would appear on the ballot. This indication would therefore not amount to the direct election of the head of government. Appointment would remain a prerogative of the president of the Republic, and lawmakers would keep their freedom of mandate.
The bill also includes a system for voters temporarily living far from their municipality of residence. It would apply notably to studies, work, or medical care. Under conditions of duration and prior registration, they would be able to vote from their temporary municipality of residence.
A Possible Advantage For Meloni, Not A Guaranteed Win
Giorgia Meloni’s coalition could benefit from the reform under three conditions. It would need to remain united, finish first, and clear the threshold in both chambers. The bonus would then turn a plurality of votes into a parliamentary majority. That is the scenario behind the critical nickname “Melonellum” used by her opponents.
Nothing, however, guarantees that these conditions will be met in the next Italian legislative elections, scheduled for 2027 unless Parliament is dissolved early. The same alliance would have to lead both contests and top 42% each time. Failing that, it would receive no bonus seats, even if it came first nationwide.
The reform also does not guarantee that the text will remain unchanged. The Senate can modify the threshold, the caps, the lists, or any other provision. The parliamentary shuttle would then push back final approval and reopen the debate in the Chamber.
Government Stability Versus Representativeness
Supporters of the bill argue that a majority would be known the night of the vote. In their view, it would reduce negotiations among parties and the time needed to form a government. They also note that the bonus would apply only above a high national threshold and that a cap would limit its size.
The opposition, by contrast, objects to the combination of a majority premium and closed lists. Democratic Party leader Elly Schlein has mentioned possible constitutional concerns. Five Star Movement leader Giuseppe Conte accuses the majority of trying to lock down power. These criticisms have not been ruled on by a court and, at this stage, should be understood as political positions.
The next round will therefore play out in the Senate. Until it votes on an identical text, Italy will keep the Rosatellum. The Stabilicum therefore does not currently assign 105 extra seats to Giorgia Meloni. It would change the way votes could become a majority in the next election.