On Tuesday, March 24, the Iran Israel conflict once again forced Paris to make urgent decisions. After another Iranian volley toward Israel and while Tehran denied direct talks with Washington, Emmanuel Macron convened a Defense Council at 5:30 p.m. For France, the stakes are threefold: protect nationals, prevent a supply crisis linked to the Strait of Hormuz, and contain rising fuel prices.
Since the night of March 24–25, 2026, a new element has, however, tempered the worst-case scenario. Iran announced, via a document submitted to the International Maritime Organization, that so-called “non-hostile” vessels could continue to transit the Strait of Hormuz under safety conditions. That signal does not amount to normalization. However, it provisionally rules out the idea of an officially declared total closure for all traffic.
Why France Reconvened a Defense Council
The day of March 24 was first marked by a new military escalation. Reuters and the Associated Press reported new waves of Iranian missiles aimed at Israel. At the same time, strikes continued in other theaters across the region. Meanwhile, Iranian officials rejected the idea of direct negotiations with the United States, contradicting Donald Trump’s message about possible diplomatic openings.
It is in this sequence that the Élysée announced another Defense and National Security Council. This body met Tuesday at 5:30 p.m. to discuss “the situation in Iran and the Middle East.” The head of state is not new to crisis meetings on this issue: the Élysée had already formalized previous councils on March 1 and 17. The decision to reconvene this format shows that the Iran Israel conflict is no longer a remote issue. For the executive, the situation has become an immediate concern. It is no longer only diplomatic or military. It has become a matter of national security and domestic stability.
France’s objective remains public and consistent: avoid regional conflagration, protect French nationals, and monitor the consequences. In addition, it seeks to track diplomatic and military developments and measure the conflict’s economic effects. On that point, the Élysée clarified earlier in the month that France was “neither warned nor involved” in the strikes. Indeed, that clarification underscores the absence of French participation in the initial military operations carried out by other countries. Politically, this line matters because it allows Paris to adopt a vigilant stance without implying broader military involvement.
Could the Strait of Hormuz Push Prices Up in France?
For the government, the most immediate threat is not only military. It also runs through energy. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic chokepoint for global oil flows, are already disrupting maritime transport. As a result, the situation is pushing up markets and increasing economic strains in the region. France remains exposed in one specific way: diesel.
This reading must be refined in light of developments overnight. In the message sent to the IMO and relayed by several international media outlets, Tehran states that “non-hostile” vessels can receive safe passage through Hormuz if they coordinate with the competent authorities. Implicitly, Iran therefore maintains pressure without announcing a simple, general reopening. U.S., Israeli, or other assets associated with the “aggression” remain explicitly targeted in this communication.
The Ministry of the Economy said it had contacted the six French refineries to assess their capacity to temporarily increase production. In particular, the request concerns the least refined products domestically, such as diesel and jet fuel. The request stems from a simple observation: before the war, more than half of the diesel consumed in France was imported, notably from the Persian Gulf. When Hormuz tightens, the vulnerability is therefore not theoretical.
This dependence helps explain why diesel has risen more than gasoline since the crisis began. The government continues to say there is, at this stage, no risk of generalized shortages. Its message is more nuanced: it is mainly aimed at easing pressure on prices. It also seeks to reduce nervousness about European supplies of refined products. In other words, Paris is less focused on promising a quick return to normalcy than on avoiding a spiral in which the war permanently raises household and business bills.
Markets even recorded an initial easing. In early trading on Wednesday, March 25, 2026, U.S. crude fell by about 4%, Reuters linking the decline to hopes for a cease-fire born of a U.S. diplomatic initiative. That retreat does not mean the shock has been absorbed. It only serves as a reminder that the threat to fuels depends as much on political and military announcements as on an immediate physical disruption of flows.
Uncertainty remains high about the real duration of the disruption. According to the New York Times and outlets that relayed its reporting, Washington transmitted to Tehran, via Pakistan, a 15-point plan to try to open a one-month cease-fire. Only several elements filtered out: demands on Iran’s nuclear program, limits on missiles, an end to support for allied armed groups, and keeping Hormuz open. The full document has not been made public. At this stage, no one can therefore claim to know the fifteen points in exact detail, while Iran continues to deny direct talks with Washington.
Transport, Fishing, Refining: What the Executive Has Already Put on the Table
France’s response, for now, is not a broad general support plan. Unlike some other European countries, Paris has chosen targeted measures. Other countries have enacted more visible fuel discounts. These measures are less costly for public finances. They first concern sectors most directly exposed to energy price spikes: road transport and fishing.
According to information released by Bercy and reported by several corroborating sources, these businesses will benefit from deferred social contributions. In addition, they will receive tax payment spreads and cash advances guaranteed by Bpifrance. The idea is to relieve cash flow without instituting a massive cut in pump taxes for everyone. This choice is consistent with the line defended since the start of the crisis: act quickly, but without creating a general budgetary scheme that is hard to finance.
The second lever lies in refining. The government is urging industry to produce more diesel and jet fuel domestically. At Gravenchon, in Seine-Maritime, the ramp-up mentioned by authorities could reach up to 10% without changing installations, amounting to several thousand additional tons per month. The timeline remains cautious: this increase could take place from the end of the week of March 30. However, it would only be possible if all operational conditions are met.
This strategy has a limit acknowledged by the state itself. TotalEnergies’ refineries are already running at full capacity, and Bercy admits it will be impossible to fully compensate in France for refining capacity lost or inaccessible in the Gulf. In short, the executive can cushion the shock, not eliminate it.
Between Crisis Diplomacy and Domestic Political Risk
This is where the Iran Israel conflict becomes a fully fledged French political issue. A prolonged diesel spike would primarily affect road professionals and fishermen. By ripple effect, logistics costs would rise. Moreover, it would fuel a highly sensitive debate over purchasing power. This would occur while the executive seeks to prevent an external crisis from triggering a new wave of social unrest.
Early reactions from exposed sectors already show the gap between the public announcement and the expected effect. In the fishing sector, professional organizations judged the government measures insufficient given the situation. That criticism does not contradict the immediate usefulness of cash aids. However, it serves as a reminder that deferred payments do not offset a sustained surge in operating costs. Indeed, a deferment of charges does not compensate for a durable spike in operating costs.
For Emmanuel Macron, the Defense Council of March 24 therefore serves to manage several fronts at once. It is about following a fluid war without overstating France’s military role, and maintaining diplomatic capacity. The sequence remains very opaque, but the state must show it is already preparing economic countermeasures. Since the night of March 24–25, Paris must reason from a risk that remains high, but less linear than a total closure of Hormuz: conditional transit for certain ships, rumors of a cease-fire, and simultaneous continuation of strikes. That triple balancing act dominates France’s response: do not give in to the logic of continuous live updates. The Hormuz crisis must not reach pumps, ports, and company ledgers. It is essential to act.
At this stage, Paris controls neither the military tempo nor the diplomatic outcome. However, the executive has already decided one thing: in this war, the boundary between foreign policy and the everyday lives of the French has ceased to be abstract.