Credits: Public Domain / Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS).
Off the coast of Madeira, a French unit immobilized a speedboat in October 2025 that refused to stop. On board, it found 2,373 kilos of cocaine. Operation Galgo, then Azul 2.0 in spring 2026, show how sea transfers extend drug trafficking into the Atlantic. Police, military, customs officers, and magistrates from several countries must now coordinate their efforts.
A 2,373-Kilo Seizure Off Madeira
The best-established fact comes down to one exact number: 2,373 kilos. In October 2025, a go-fast failed to comply with an order to stop from a French Navy unit. The scene took place in international waters, off the Portuguese archipelago of Madeira. The French force disabled its engines. A team then boarded and discovered the cocaine, according to the MAOC-N operational press release.
Four crew members were detained. The boat, the cargo, and the case were then handed over to the Spanish authorities. Public documents do not specify the identity or nationality of these individuals. Nor do they indicate the jurisdiction ultimately seized of the case or the current status of the proceedings. Their interception therefore does not constitute a final accusation or a conviction.
This seizure was the most visible result of Galgo, an operation prepared after a coordination meeting held in February 2025. The official Galgo report states that three frigates, three surveillance aircraft, and two helicopters were involved. These assets were deployed across several zones identified by intelligence. France, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States provided assets or specialized services.
The operation was not limited to naval forces. It brought together the French anti-narcotics office, customs intelligence services, and the customs coast guard. Portugal’s judicial police, the UK’s National Crime Agency, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration also took part. MAOC-N, the multinational maritime drug trafficking analysis center, served as the coordination hub among these actors.
A Maritime Go-Fast, A Quick Link In A Longer Chain
In France, the term go-fast often refers to a road convoy used to transport narcotics quickly. At sea, it does not refer to a specific type of boat. It describes a method based on a fast, heavily powered vessel suited to long trips. That vessel is not necessarily intended to cross the Atlantic alone. It can pick up a cargo brought offshore by a ship following a transatlantic route. It then brings it closer to the European coast or passes it to another relay.
This splitting of the journey serves a simple goal: to avoid having a single boat make the entire trip. It also helps bypass some of the checks concentrated in major ports. It makes surveillance harder. Crews operate across a vast area, far from the coastline. Public authorities must then combine intelligence, aerial observation, and the ability to intervene at sea.
The investigation published by Le Monde and its partners places Galgo surveillance between October 9 and 19, 2025. It reports that about fifteen go-fasts were spotted in Macaronesia. This area notably includes the Canary Islands, Madeira, and the Azores. These two details come from confidential documents obtained by the newsrooms; MAOC-N mentions only several boats detected in international waters.
The conditions under which these boats are used are described as dangerous, without making it possible to measure the scale of the phenomenon. In the same investigation, Dimitri Zoulas, head of Ofast, uses the phrase “Mad Max on the ocean” as an illustration. No publicly available count makes it possible to say how many of these boats are active in the Atlantic. Their fueling, possible weaponry, and links to specific cartels remain insufficiently documented. Open institutional sources do not allow these details to be confirmed.
Azul 2.0 Confirms The Importance Of The Atlantic Corridor
Eight months after Galgo, a second operation targeted the same vast region. From May 27 to June 15, 2026, Azul 2.0 focused on the eastern Atlantic, between the Canary Islands, Madeira, and the Azores. The Portuguese judicial police led it with support from MAOC-N, Frontex, and Europol. Spanish, French, British, and American services also took part.
The MAOC-N report on Azul 2.0 lists 465 kilos of cocaine and 42 kilos of hashish seized. Two fast boats and about 800 liters of fuel were also seized. Frontex provided aerial surveillance assets. MAOC-N helped collect, cross-check, and analyze intelligence.
Galgo and Azul 2.0 are not enough to establish a quantified increase in the use of go-fasts. They do show, however, that the corridor is being treated as a lasting operational zone, beyond a one-off interception. They also illustrate a step-by-step logic: multiple transport methods, relays at sea, and an organization spread across different territories.
Ports Remain At The Heart Of Cocaine Trafficking
The visibility of these speedboats should not make us forget the overall scale of the market. In its European Drug Report 2026, the European agency records 97,000 cocaine seizures in 2024. They totaled 330 tonnes in EU member states, down from 419 tonnes in 2023. Container trafficking in commercial ports remains a major factor behind the high availability of cocaine in Europe.
These data do not break down volumes among containers, mother ships, fast boats, and other transport methods. It is therefore impossible to infer the exact share of go-fasts. The Galgo and Azul 2.0 seizures prove that this channel can move several tons or hundreds of kilos. They do not show that it has replaced port routes.
Diversification is nonetheless a challenge. Tightening controls in a major port can shift part of the flows to other facilities. They can also move to smaller ports or offshore transfers. For authorities, the response therefore cannot rely on a single physical border. It must track networks, vessels, and cargoes from one territory to another.
At Sea, Interception Is Also A Legal Matter
Cooperation is essential. The same operation may combine intelligence gathered in one country with military assets provided by another. Interception may take place in international waters, with legal proceedings then handed over to a third state. Galgo provides a clear example. The French Navy intervened under the supervision of the Brest maritime prefecture before transfer to the Spanish authorities.
Public statements indicate that the boat’s engines were disabled after a refusal to comply. They do not detail the legal basis used or the rules of engagement applied. Nor do they explain why the follow-up was entrusted to Spain. In the absence of these elements, it would be excessive to present Galgo as a new European doctrine for the use of force.
The institutional chain matters as much as the ships and aircraft. Analysis centers bring information together, then maritime forces locate and intercept. Judicial authorities must then secure the evidence and determine jurisdiction. An operational success is only lasting if it can be followed by an investigation and due process.
Tangible Results, But Still Little Public Data
The two operations deliver verifiable results: cargoes seized, boats removed from circulation, and documented international cooperation. Yet they still leave several questions open. No public series tracks the number of go-fasts detected each year in the Atlantic. Their interception rate and the share of cocaine they transport to Europe are also unknown.
There is also a lack of public information on the judicial follow-up to the October 2025 interception and on the precise organization of the networks involved. As long as these data are unavailable, caution is warranted. Galgo and Azul 2.0 attest to a trafficking method significant enough to mobilize frigates, aircraft, and judicial services. They still do not allow us to measure its full extent.