Raphaël Glucksmann appears in close-up, looking toward the camera. The Member of the European Parliament says he was targeted by Storm-1516 ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Credits: Librairie Mollat / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.
On Tuesday, August 4, Raphaël Glucksmann says he was informed by the SGDSN. According to him, the service attributed the disinformation operation to Storm-1516. A fake site imitating Blast, a doctored video, and hijacked journalist identities were used to spread a false story involving Léa Salamé. The episode, still not widely visible, sheds light on the risks already surrounding the 2027 French presidential election.
A Fake Outlet Built To Look Credible
In a statement posted on LinkedIn, the Member of the European Parliament says the SGDSN warned him of a Storm-1516 attack. The Place publique leader says this network is "directly run by the GRU," Russian military intelligence. That latest attribution at this stage rests on his account: no public technical note from the SGDSN or VIGINUM specifically documents the operation.
The setup copied Blast’s look and almost its address. The outlet said the fake site had reproduced 181 pages exactly. A single fabricated article had been slipped in, with fake documents and a video using an artificial voice. The story falsely accused Léa Salamé, Raphaël Glucksmann’s partner. It claimed she had tried to influence newsrooms in favor of a possible run for the Élysée.
Edwy Plenel denied having received the email attributed to him and said his voice had been altered. Salomé Saqué also denounced false revelations. Blast says it has taken steps to shut down the fake site and filed a complaint for counterfeiting and identity theft.
Storm-1516 Corroborated, The GRU Still Not Proven
A security source confirmed to AFP that Storm-1516 carried out the operation. It had been detected at the end of the previous week. The source described dissemination as "relatively low," but the setup as "relatively sophisticated." A source close to the case cited by franceinfo adds that CopyCop would have provided support.
VIGINUM documents Storm-1516 as a Russian information operation method active since late 2023. It combines fake sites, fabricated content, and artificial intelligence techniques. This general classification provides context; it does not constitute public technical proof of GRU involvement in this specific episode.
A Test Before The 2027 Campaign
Raphaël Glucksmann is not yet a declared candidate in the presidential election: he still has to decide whether to run. The combined reach of the fake content, the accounts that relayed it, and the platforms’ responses has not been publicly established. The procedural status of the complaint announced by Blast also remains to be confirmed.
Eight months before the vote, the immediate issue is therefore not to conclude that this is a massive campaign. The visible facts, the reported security attribution, and Raphaël Glucksmann’s broader accusation against the GRU must be kept separate.