When the Middle East Falters, Europe Immediately Rediscovers the Vulnerability of Its Supplies. Since Mid-March 2026, the Regional War Has Brought Back to the Fore a Question Once Said to Be Settled. Indeed, this Question Was Considered Partly Resolved After the Major Reorganization of the Continent’s Gas Supplies. Where to Find, Quickly, Safer Volumes, Closer, Less Exposed to the Turmoil of the Gulf? In This Geography of Urgency, Algeria Reappears as an Obvious Choice. It Is There, on the Other Side of the Mediterranean, Long Linked to Several Member States, Already Connected to the European Market. But a Geographical Obviousness Is Not Yet an Industrial Solution. That Is the Whole Question.
The Return of Algiers to a Newly Worried Europe
What Has Been Playing Out in Recent Days Goes Far Beyond a Mere Market Movement. European Gas Has Once Again Risen in Prominence, Following Fears Linked to Gulf Exports and the Sea Lanes That Carry a Decisive Share of Liquefied Natural Gas. RFI, in Its Editions of March 19 and 29, and France 24 in Its Analyses Broadcast at the Same Time, Describe the Same Sequence. It Only Takes a Disruption to Threaten the Strait of Hormuz or Regional Gas Facilities. Then Operators Immediately Raise the Risk Price. Even Without an Immediate and Widespread Interruption of Deliveries, the European Market Tightens.
This Nervousness Is Not Irrational. Since the Collapse of Russian Pipeline Imports, the Union Has Substantially Increased Its Use of Liquefied Natural Gas. This Diversification Opened New Entry Points. It Also Made Europe More Sensitive to Shocks in Global Maritime Trade. Therefore, a Middle East Crisis Is Not an External Event Europe Would Observe from Afar. It Acts as a Revealer of Dependence. It Underscores That European Energy Security Still Depends on Places Far from Its Decision Centers. Moreover, It Plays Out at the Intersection of Sea Routes, LNG Terminals, and the Most Volatile Commercial Arbitrages.
It Is in This Context That Algeria Regains a Singular Place. Not Because It Suddenly Has Unlimited Wealth. But Because It Is One of the Few Nearby Suppliers Already Rooted in the European Energy Landscape. According to Eurostat, It Still Accounted for 14.6% of Extra-European Imports of Gaseous Gas in the Third Quarter of 2025. This Figure Does Not Say How Much Algiers Could Add to Current Flows Tomorrow. It Does, However, Say One Essential Thing. Algeria Is Not a Desk Hypothesis. It Is Already One of the Pillars of the System.
Italy Understood This Before Many Others, or Rather, It Never Forgot It. Rome Has Been Trying for Several Years to Strengthen Its Role as an Energy Hub in the Mediterranean. But This Strategic Ambition Is Coupled with a Very Concrete Vulnerability. According to the International Energy Agency, More Than 40% of Italian Electricity Is Still Produced from Gas. In These Conditions, Every Price Spike Becomes a Matter of Competitiveness, Purchasing Power, and Political Stability. That Giorgia Meloni Is Looking Again Toward Algiers Is Therefore Not a Symbolic Gesture. It Is a Calculation of Necessity.
The Pipes Exist, Margins Are Less Obvious
The Political Narrative Often Moves Faster Than Infrastructure. Yet It Is the Infrastructure That Sets the Limits of What Is Possible. On the Spanish Side, the Main Axis Remains Medgaz, the Subsea Pipeline Connecting Beni Saf to Almería. Its Operator Claims a Capacity of 10.16 Billion Cubic Meters Per Year. On the Italian Side, the Major Corridor Remains Transmed, Which Crosses Tunisia Before Reaching the Peninsula. Historical Industrial Data from Eni Put Its Theoretical Capacity Around 33.2 Billion Cubic Meters Per Year. To That Are Added Algerian Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas, Loaded from Coastal Terminals and Redirected According to Market Needs.
On Paper, This Architecture Is Impressive. It Explains Why Algeria Returns So Quickly to European Conversations Whenever a Regional Disorder Threatens Gulf Flows. But Paper Is Not the Field. An Announced Capacity Does Not Automatically Correspond to an Available Volume. Between the Theoretical Figure and the Gas Actually Mobilizable, Several Factors Intervene. Indeed, Upstream Production and Domestic Needs Play an Important Role. Moreover, Maintenance Constraints and Existing Contractual Commitments Also Influence This Availability. Finally, the State of the Networks Is Also Determinant in This Complex Equation.
This Is Precisely the Note of Caution Highlighted by France 24 in Its March 24 Article on Algerian Capacities. The Media Poses Head-On the Question Many Officials Avoid Out of Convenience. Can Algeria Compensate for European Needs? The Answer, as It Emerges from Cited Experts and Available Data, Is Nuanced but Firm. Yes, Algiers Can Help Cushion the Shock. No, It Cannot Replace All the Volumes Europe Would Like to Secure in the Short Term. Indeed, If the Regional Crisis Were to Last or Worsen, That Substitution Would Remain Impossible.
This Nuance Is Not a Technical Detail. It Separates Serious Analysis from the Convenient Narrative. Presenting Algeria as a Total Backup Would Be to Succumb to an Illusion of Proximity. The Country Has Strong Assets. It Has Geography on Its Side, Operational Infrastructure, a Longstanding Relationship with European Buyers, and a National Company, Sonatrach, Accustomed to These Sensitive Negotiations. But It Does Not Possess an Infinite Reservoir from Which Europe Could Draw at Will.
Spain and Italy, for Their Part, Do Not Express the Same Expectations. Madrid Looks First at the Solidity of Medgaz, Which Became Crucial After the Halt of the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline That Transited Through Morocco. Rome, for Its Part, Sees a Broader Picture. It Hopes to Consolidate Its Supply, but Also to Strengthen Its Role as an Energy Crossroads Between North Africa and the Rest of the Continent. This Difference in Perspective Sheds Light on Many Recent Statements. Italy Is Not Only Looking for Gas. It Is Also Seeking a Position.
A Neighborhood Power, Not an Unlimited Promise
For Algiers, the Sequence Opens a Diplomatic as Well as an Economic Window. In a Europe Worried About Shortages, the Neighbor Who Can Still Deliver Naturally Gains Influence. Algerian Authorities Know This. The Country Regains Centrality in Energy Exchanges, Revived by the Ukrainian Crisis. Moreover, This Centrality Is Accentuated by the New Middle Eastern Tension. Yet This Centrality Does Not Erase Any of the Structural Constraints That Weigh on It.
Fields Do Not Develop at the Speed of Press Releases. Investments Take Time. Production Capacities Are Not Decreed from a Negotiation Room. And Above All, Domestic Algerian Demand Continues to Weigh on the Export Equation. Sector Analysts Often Emphasize This Element. In Addition, the Media Have Documented This Renewed European Interest. Algeria Can Sell More Within Certain Limits. It Cannot Instantly Become an All-Risk Insurance Policy for the Union.
It Should Therefore Be Described for What It Really Is in This Crisis. Neither a Simple Backup Wheel, Given Its Already Established Role in the European System. Nor an Energy Savior, Because No Verified Figures Support Such a Claim. The Most Accurate Image Is Probably That of a Strategic Bumper. A Supplier Can Absorb Part of the Shockwave. Thus, It Buys Time for Buyers and Reduces Immediate Exposure. However, It Cannot Abolish the Continent’s Vulnerability.
Seen from Paris, the Issue Is Less That of a Spectacular Bilateral Dependence Than That of a European Market Put Back Under Pressure. France Does Not Appear, in the Sources Used Here, to Be the Country Most Directly Politically Exposed to an Increased Share of Algerian Gas. On the Other Hand, It Remains Fully Concerned by Price Volatility, by the Balance of the Continental Market, and by the Strategic Arbitrages of Its Neighbors. The Real Question Is Therefore Not Only Who Will Buy Which Additional Volume. It Is to Understand What This Sequence Reveals About Europe Itself. A Continent That Has Indeed Diversified Its Dependencies Since 2022, But Has Not EliminATED Them. It Has Shifted Them, Sometimes Dispersed Them, Never Erased Them.
The Lesson from This March Is Clear. Europe Has Not Erased Its Gas Vulnerability. It Has Moved It. As Soon as a War Threatens Gulf Routes, Dependencies, Prices, and Distances Regain All Their Force. In This Equation, Algeria Is Neither a Providence Nor a Secondary Actor. It Remains an Indispensable Neighbor, Capable of Absorbing Part of the Shock, Without Alone Offering the Security the Continent Still Lacks.