Donald Trump wanted to pull the curtain before the show was over. On March 9, 2026, the U.S. president said the war with Iran was “virtually over.” He also said it was “well ahead” of schedule. However, a few hours later, the situation looked different. The Pentagon announced that March 10 would be the most intense day of strikes. Indeed, this would surpass those since the start of the offensive on February 28. In Tehran, explosions were still being reported. In Paris, Emmanuel Macron convened a new Defense Council. In the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz remained at the center of all fears.
A War Said To Be Almost Over, At The Same Time It Intensifies
Donald Trump’s sentence hit with its bluntness. It was meant to install a simple idea: the military campaign had already produced most of its effects. According to him, Iran would no longer have a real navy. It would also lack robust communications and an air force capable of reversing the balance of power. In this version, the war is no longer a conflict to conduct, but a victory to be narrated.
The problem is that the day’s facts resist that narrative. Pete Hegseth, the U.S. secretary of defense, says this Tuesday will be the peak of American strikes in Iran. He spoke of the largest number of fighter jets, bombers and strikes engaged so far. A war that is ending does not, in principle, announce its highest degree of intensity.
That is the contradiction of the moment. On one side, the White House suggests a tipping point has been reached. On the other, the U.S. military apparatus speaks as if it were an ongoing campaign. Israeli officials adopt the same rhetoric. Moreover, this shows their perception of the current situation. They do not speak of an exit. Benyamin Netanyahou and Ambassador Joshua Zarka also say that Israel is ahead of its objectives, while explaining that the Iran–Israel conflict has not finished with the Iranian regime. The verb announces an end. The action still prepares a sequel.
Iran-United States: Why Washington Believes In A Near Outcome
There are, however, reasons to take seriously the hypothesis of a quick end. The first lies in the overwhelming military superiority displayed by the United States and Israel. Washington says it has struck more than 5,000 targets and destroyed 50 Iranian vessels. These figures come from the belligerents and cannot be independently verified at this stage. But they measure the message the Americans are trying to impose: Iran would be durably disorganized.
The second reason is political. By declaring the war nearing its end, Donald Trump is also speaking to the markets. Oil immediately reacted to this prospect of a lull. After recent spikes, the idea of a shorter-than-expected conflict temporarily eased pressure on energy. It also reduced tension on stock markets. In a conflict where oil matters almost as much as missiles, the presidential narrative is also an instrument of stabilization.
The third reason is psychological. Repeated strikes, the speed of the offensive and the show of force can produce a stunning effect. Washington and Tel Aviv may hope the weakened Iranian regime will choose to limit its options. This is due to a lack of credible military means and the fear of a more devastating shock.
But this reading assumes one essential thing: that the adversary agrees to measure the war by its enemies’ criteria. Nothing, for now, allows us to say that.
What Contradicts The Idea Of An Imminent End
The first limit is Iranian. Iran’s response to American strikes remains that of a war meant to last. Negotiations with the United States, they say, are no longer on the agenda. As long as no identifiable diplomatic sequence appears, the end-of-war formula remains a gamble. Indeed, it is perceived more as a bet than as an observation.
The second limit is geographic. The conflict already spills far beyond Iranian territory. In Lebanon, Israeli strikes continue in the south and east, notably around Tyre, Sidon, Jezzine and in the Bekaa. The human toll reported during the period is rising rapidly: 486 dead and 1,313 wounded in one week. These figures were relayed on March 9, then more than 667,000 displaced were recorded on March 10. Indeed, that represents 100,000 more people in just twenty-four hours. When a war spreads its shock waves like this, its end no longer depends only on the original center of strikes.
The third limit is strategic. The Strait of Hormuz remains a vital choke point. Iran threatens to disrupt or block regional oil exports. Gulf countries fear a global economic crisis. Doha warned about the consequences of attacks on energy infrastructure. Even if the main military front slowed, the war could survive in the form of a maritime, economic and energy battle.
Finally, there is the timeline of allies. Israeli officials do not speak of a political conclusion ready to be signed. They speak of unfinished objectives. That is a heavy clue. One can win the military initiative without yet having a formula for exit.
Paris Prepares For A Crisis That May Last
In Paris, the language is not that of an imminent victory, but of crisis management expected to last. Emmanuel Macron convened a Defense and National Security Council. Indeed, it will be held on March 10, 2026 at 6:30 p.m. This council will address “the situation in Iran and the Middle East.” The French logic is twofold.
It is essential to protect nationals, diplomatic and military sites. Also, partners of France must be secured. From the first days of the escalation, the executive insisted on the safety of bases. It also emphasized repatriation capacity and adaptation of the defensive posture.
Then there is monitoring maritime traffic and the economic consequences of the conflict. Hormuz is more than a passage. It is a global artery. If it closes, or becomes too dangerous, the war changes scale. It no longer concerns only Middle Eastern capitals. It hits prices, supply, maritime insurance, inflation, and therefore daily life far beyond the front.
This French positioning says something important. A war can seem militarily dominated without being politically closed. So long as the safety of civilians, allies and trade routes remains threatened, the idea of a near end seems fragile. Consequently, this situation makes it hard to believe in an imminent conclusion.
Did Trump Declare War On Iran? Why An End Can’t Be Decreed
The present moment thus opposes two partial truths. Yes, American-Israeli military superiority can make a deep weakening of Iran credible. Yes, Donald Trump’s communication can prepare a political landing, reassure markets and frame the image of a short campaign. But no, that is not yet enough to prove the war is truly nearing its end.
Because a war does not end when a president says so. It ends when the strikes stop and allies converge on the same sequence. It also ends when the adversary accepts anything other than survival by escalation. Finally, a minimum political exit must become visible. Yet on March 10, 2026, none of these criteria is fully met.
Bombs are still falling. The Pentagon announces its most intense day. Israel speaks of incomplete objectives. Tehran promises to endure. The Lebanon is already paying a terrible price. And Hormuz continues to threaten the global economy like a blade over oil trade.
The war may have entered a decisive phase. That is not nothing. But between a decisive phase and a finished war lies the essential: the ability to impose an exit. As long as that exit has neither a diplomatic face nor a credible timetable, Donald Trump’s phrasing will seem different. Indeed, it will look less like an observation than an attempt to regain control of the narrative.